Institutional investors and mispricing of unionized firms
Viktoriya Lantushenko, Dalia Marciukaityte, Samuel H. Szewczyk

We examine investment by different types of institutional investors in firms with strong labor unions. We find that hedge funds own a lower percentage of shares in these firms than in other firms. In contrast, passive institutional investors and institutional investors as a group own a higher percentage. Our tests suggest that the relation between unionization and hedge fund ownership is causal: When union power changes in a firm, hedge fund ownership changes in the opposite direction. Instead, passive investor holdings in unionized firms seem to be driven by other firm characteristics.
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CEO–board connections and the cost of equity capital: International evidence
Md Nazmul Hasan Bhuyan, David Javakhadze

In this article, we investigate the effect of chief executive officer (CEO)–board connections on the cost of equity capital in an international setting. We find that CEO–board connections have a significant negative effect on the cost of equity. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements, model specifications, and potential endogeneity adjustments. Examining the channel, we show that social ties reduce information asymmetry issues. We further show that firm-level operational complexities and investment intensity, as well as country-level developmental attributes and culture, moderate the association between CEO–board connections and the cost of equity capital.
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Predicting corporate restructuring and financial distress in banks: The case of the Swiss banking industry
Daniel Boos, Nikolaos Karampatsas, Wolfgang Garn, Lampros K. Stergioulas

The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 is widely regarded as the worst since the Great Depression and threatened the global financial system with a total collapse. This article distinguishes itself from the vast literature of bankruptcy, bank failure, and bank exit prediction models by introducing novel categorical parameters inspired by Switzerland’s banking landscape. We evaluate data from 274 banks in Switzerland from 2007 to 2017 using generalized linear model logit and multinomial logit regressions and examine the determinants of corporate restructuring and financial distress. We complement our results with a robustness test via a Bayesian inference framework. We find that total assets and net interest margin affect bank exit and mergers and acquisitions, and that banks operating in the Zurich area have a higher likelihood of exiting and becoming takeover targets relative to banks operating in the Geneva area.
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Excess cash and equity option liquidity
Min Deng, Minh Nguyen

We examine the relation between excess corporate cash holdings and equity option market liquidity from January 3, 2005 to December 31, 2019. We show that the level of cash reserve in excess of what can be captured by firm characteristics significantly explains stock option liquidity. Trading volume and option open interest increase in companies with a higher magnitude of excess cash, whereas the bid–ask spreads of stock options decline in excess cash. Our findings confirm the theoretical prediction that excess cash improves option market liquidity as it reduces adverse selection problems caused by uncertainty in firm valuations. This relation remains more pronounced with put options, out-of-the-money contracts, and short-maturity contracts. In addition, excess cash has a stronger impact on option liquidity within firms that have a greater degree of informed trading and during high-volatility periods in financial markets. Our results show that when uncertainty about firm prospects rises, excess cash becomes more valuable and affects option market liquidity.
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The role of the dual holder in mitigating underinvestment
Roman Bohdan, Tarun Mukherjee

The literature on dual holding focuses exclusively on cases where the holder is primarily a creditor and buys the firm’s stocks to reduce potential wealth transfer. However, wealth transfer is not a concern when the dual holder is a stockholder first and becomes a bondholder later. We hypothesize that the principal motive behind such dual holdings is to provide debt funding to an otherwise successful firm that cannot fund good projects because of internal capital allocation problems coupled with external capital constraints. We select samples from multinational corporations based on evidence that these firms are exposed to domestic underinvestment because they are reluctant to bring back foreign profits to avoid repatriation taxes. We choose hedge funds (HFs) as dual holders. The treatment group comprises firms where HFs are dual owners, and the control group comprises firms in which HFs own stocks only. The treatment group experiences steeper financial constraints, leading to deeper underinvestment problems and causing target firms to seek HF funding. The funding corresponds well to the amount of underinvestment. Targets improve investment efficiency by alleviating underinvestment, surpassing their predual performance and the control group’s postdual performance.
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Lending and risk controls for BHCs after the Dodd–Frank act
Marta Degl’Innocenti, Si Zhou, Yue Zhou

We investigate the impact of the Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) on the credit risk behavior of complex bank holding companies (BHCs). Specifically, we assess the effectiveness of the DFA in reducing the credit riskiness of complex banks. Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, we find that complex BHCs affected by the DFA increase their credit risk. We argue that possible explanations are that BHCs decreased their lending portfolio quality, loan monitoring, and strength and independence of the risk management function after the DFA. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns, different sample selection criteria, various model and treatment specifications, and placebo tests.
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Corporate cash holdings and industry risk
Jinsook Lee

I conjecture that a firm’s sensitivity to industry shocks escalates its need to retain a cash buffer. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that a 1 SD increase in a firm’s industry risk exposure increases cash holdings by 10%. In fact, industry risk has a greater effect on corporate cash holdings than does economywide and idiosyncratic risk in my sample. The effect of industry risk exposure on corporate cash holdings is greater for firms in highly competitive industries, as well as for firms with high leverage, a greater fraction of short-term debt, and few tangible assets.
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Active mutual funds and their passive ETF investments
Hsiu-Lang Chen

Investing in exchange-traded funds (ETFs) rather than investing directly in the underlying securities surely prompts questions for mutual funds. Why? Examination suggests the answer is to reduce overall portfolio volatility. Actively managed open-end equity funds (OEFs) that invest in ETFs tend to take short positions in securities and to short ETFs more than other securities. Investigation of the overlap in portfolio composition between OEFs and the ETFs they hold as well as their investing positions in hedging and nonhedging ETFs separately points to the main motivation for such ETF investment—hedging.

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